Research

Job Market Paper

Matching with Property Rights: an Application to Korean Teacher Transfer Program [Current version: PDF]

I model a teacher transfer program in South Korea as a matching-with-contracts problem. The current (non-centralized) system allows a teacher wishing to make an inter-state transfer to submit at most one application and will approve only a one-on-one exchange. Consequently, not only is this current system unstable and wasteful, but it also does not adequately reflect their preferences.
     In contrast, the centralized mechanism I propose fully reflect teachers’ preferences and is less wasteful. One key requirement of a teacher transfer program is that it must protect the rights of currently existing teachers who wish to transfer from their current positions for a short period of time only, possibly to satisfy familial needs. However, as I demonstrate, no stable mechanism exists to always protect the rights of such teachers to the positions they currently occupy. 
     To solve this problem, I introduce a novel concept called a claim contract. A claim contract, in a matching-with-contract environment, protects existing teachers by removing contracts that do not match the specified duration set by these teachers from the set of potential matches. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism based on the claim contract that is strategy-proof and approximates stable matching.
 
  • Matching with Property Rights: presented at the Conference on Economic Design, York, United Kingdom (June 2017)
  • Parking Space Assignment Problem: presented at the ITEA Annual Conference on Transportation Economics, Barcelona, Spain (June 2017) 
  • Poster session at the International Workshop on the Economics of Parking, Barcelona, Spain (November 2016)

Working paper

Parking Space Assignment Problem: a Matching Mechanism Design Approach

     I model parking problem in urban areas as a matching problem. First, I model parking market as a strategic game and show that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the cruising game is equivalent to the set of stable allocations. However, it is not reasonable to expect the drivers to reach a Nash equilibrium in the decentralized system due to the lack of information and coordination failure. Therefore, a centralized system can improve the market and allocation the spaces more efficiently. I suggest a centralized mechanism with which a parking authority can assign available spaces to drivers in a stable way.

  • Matching with Property Rights: presented at the Conference on Economic Design, York, United Kingdom (June 2017)
  • Parking Space Assignment Problem: presented at the ITEA Annual Conference on Transportation Economics, Barcelona, Spain (June 2017) 
  • Poster session at the International Workshop on the Economics of Parking, Barcelona, Spain (November 2016)

Housing Market with Contract

     I study a housing market problem with contract, where resources can be offered in two contractual terms, with a leading example of teacher exchange in Korea. I impose a restriction to this market, namely equal-term constraint, which requires exchanges be made in the same contractual terms. With this restriction, I show that there is no mechanism that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, equal-term, and strategy proof. I further show that strategy proofness is not compatible with Pareto improving from initial endowment. Therefore, I suggest a mechanism called Top Trading Cycle (TTC) with Counter Offer, which is individually rational and efficient under equal-term restriction.  TTC with Counter O er works as a normal TTC, except that it allows a counter offer which demands a contract with different terms, thus allowing it to find a potential cycle with equal terms.

 

Market Design Approach to Congested Transportation System

Jinyong Jeong & Sera Linardi

 

 

Research in Progress

J. Jeong, “A Modication to Korean College Admissions”
J. Jeong, S. Linardi, and D. Vamossy, “Get Me Out of Here! An Experiment on Paying Not to Wait”
J. Jeong, S. Linardi, “Market Design Approach to Congested Transportation System”