Job Market Paper
“Matching with Priorities and Property Rights: An Application to a Parking Space Assignment Problem” [Current version: PDF]
I introduce parking in urban areas as a matching problem. First, I model street parking market as a strategic game and show that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the cruising game is equivalent to the set of stable allocations. However, it is not reasonable to expect the drivers to reach a Nash equilibrium in the decentralized system due to the lack of information and coordination failure. Therefore, a centralized system can improve the market and allocate the spaces more efficiently. I suggest a centralized mechanism with which a parking authority can assign available spaces to drivers in a stable way.
The model incorporates residents’ parking spaces, such that visitors could access vacant residents’ spaces. To use the residents’ parking spaces, the system needs to protect exclusive property rights over their parking spaces. I show that, however, there is no mechanism that is stable and protects residents’ rights. To resolve this issue, I introduce a new concept, a claim contract and suggest a mechanism that protects property rights, is strategy-proof for the drivers, and approximates a stable matching.
Besides its market-design focus, this paper handles both property-based and property right-based assignment, which were considered separately in the matching theory literature. This is the main theoretical contribution of this paper.
Note: this paper is combined with two separately presented works at the conferences below.
- Matching with Property Rights: presented at the Conference on Economic Design, York, United Kingdom (June 2017)
- Parking Space Assignment Problem: presented at the ITEA Annual Conference on Transportation Economics, Barcelona, Spain (June 2017)
- Poster session at the International Workshop on the Economics of Parking, Barcelona, Spain (November 2016)
“Efficient Matching with Ordered Endowments”
I study an efficient matching problem in a discrete resource exchange market where each agent’s endowment is an “ordered” list of two items. That is, the second item cannot be consumed/traded before the first item is consumed/traded. The leading examples of such problems are student exchanges among universities, house and car swapping for vacation housing among many others. In student exchange, either a student can leave the school for the first semester or both semesters (but not only second semester). In vacation house trading, either the house can be traded or house and car together, but not the car itself. I propose two efficient mechanisms for this problem: Top-Trading Cycles with Counter Offers and Dual Top-Trading Cycles.